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ABSTRACT
We examine the effect of HIV/AIDS infection risks on the earnings of registered nurses (RNs) and
other health care workers by combining data on metropolitan statistical area (MSA) AIDS prevalence
rates with annual 1987 ￿2001 Current Population Survey (CPS) and quadrennial 1988 ￿2000
National Sample Survey of Registered Nurses (SRN) data. Holding constant wages of control groups
that are likely not exposed to AIDS risks and group-specific MSA fixed effects, a 10 percent increase
in the AIDS rate raises RN earnings by about 0.8 percent in post-1992 samples, when AIDS rates
were falling but a more comprehensive categorization of AIDS was used by the CDC. AIDS wage
differentials are much larger for RNs and non-nursing health practitioners than for other nursing and
health care workers, suggesting that this differential represents compensation paid for job-related
exposure to potentially HIV-infected blood.
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  The labor market for health care workers has changed substantially over the past two 
decades.  Medicare prospective payment system adoption, managed care evolution, hospital 
industry consolidation and rapid technological change all had considerable effects on the health 
care employment environment.
1  During that time, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) emerged as a top public health issue, as health practitioners and researchers scrambled to 
first understand the nature of the disease and then devise methods to reduce both its transmission 
and lethality.  AIDS has had a profound effect on the health care sector, as funds have been 
poured into research for effective treatments and a vaccine while clinicians and administrators 
have struggled to contain costs of patient care while finding ways to finance it.  Despite this, the 
impact of AIDS on health care labor markets has received scant attention from economists. 
  AIDS occurs through infection with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which is 
transmitted by blood-to-blood and sexual contact.  HIV causes AIDS by destroying CD4+ T 
blood cells that are crucial to immune system functioning, though people infected with HIV can 
carry the virus for years before the immune system is sufficiently damaged for AIDS to develop.  
An HIV-infected person is diagnosed with AIDS after developing one of the CDC-defined AIDS 
indicator illnesses or on the basis of CD4+ counts.  
The first U.S. AIDS case was reported in June 1981.  The number of reported AIDS cases 
increased each subsequent year, partially because of expansions in case definitions in 1985, 1987 
and 1993, until peaking at 104,759 in 1993.  Reported cases declined each year thereafter until 
reaching a low of 40,307 in 2000, as awareness about how to avoid contracting HIV grew and 
increasingly effective treatment delayed progression of HIV infection to AIDS, and then rose 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of these issues, see Buerhaus and Staiger (1996), Gaynor and Haas-Wilson (1999), Schumacher 
(2001) and Spetz (1999).  
  1again to 41,334 in 2001 and 42,651 in 2002.  Of the 830,274 people in the U.S. diagnosed with 
AIDS through 2002, 483,615 have died (CDC, various years). 
Since HIV is transmitted through blood and other bodily fluids, including those 
surrounding the brain, spinal cord, bone joints, and unborn babies, health care workers who 
provide patient care risk contracting HIV from infected patients.  Workers presumably require 
monetary compensation for the potential risk of contracting HIV and the burden of increased 
precautions required to avoid this risk, relative to similar jobs that do not involve HIV/AIDS 
risk.  In particular, the theory of compensating wage differentials holds that jobs having 
relatively unpleasant characteristics must offer higher wages than otherwise similar jobs in order 
to attract workers, with the equilibrium wage premium being just enough to compensate workers 
for having to deal with the unpleasantness.  A health care example of this is the finding of 
Schumacher and Hirsch (1997) that wages for registered nurses (RNs) employed in hospitals are 
20 percent higher than are those of comparable RNs employed elsewhere.  The authors attribute 
about half of this differential to the less desirable working conditions of hospitals relative to 
other settings in which RNs work. 
Through the end of 2000, 57 health care workers, including 24 nurses, were known to 
have acquired HIV following occupational exposure, and 25 of them had developed AIDS.  All 
but seven of these workers were exposed to HIV-infected blood.  Another 138 cases of HIV 
infection or AIDS are documented as having occurred among health care workers, 35 of whom 
were nurses, who reported no other risk factors and a history of occupational exposure to blood, 
body fluids, or HIV-infected laboratory material (CDC 2001).  Even though such incidents 
represent an extremely small fraction of the nursing and overall health care workforces, the 
threat of HIV infection is of great concern to potentially exposed workers because the 
  2consequences are so severe (Boland 1990).  In addition, workers might bear some of the time and 
inconvenience costs associated with infection prevention. 
  Some effects of AIDS on nurses have been studied in the nursing trade literature (e.g. 
Boland 1990, Cole and Slocumb 1993, Worthington 2001).  However, only one study has 
examined the potential impact of AIDS on health care labor markets.  Using 1987–1993 Current 
Population Survey (CPS) data on earnings of nurses in 43 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), 
Faucher (1996) finds that AIDS prevalence at the MSA level is positively associated with RN 
wages.  This is the relationship predicted by compensating wage differential theory: as AIDS 
rates rise, so does the chance that a nurse will encounter a patient with AIDS, and hence the risk 
of HIV/AIDS transmission.  Estimates imply that AIDS raised RN wages by three to four percent 
and reduced hours worked by over one percent.  These results persist when MSA fixed effects 
are included in the regressions. 
Our paper examines the effects of AIDS rates on the wages of health care workers over 
the 1987–2001 period.  Like Faucher (1996), our main analysis combines MSA-level AIDS 
prevalence data with annual CPS data.
2  Because the CDC changed the definition of AIDS in 
1993 to encompass cases that previously would not have been categorized as AIDS, we 
separately analyze the 1987–1992 and 1993–2001 periods.  This coincidentally divides the data 
into distinct eras of rising and declining AIDS rates, as well as rapidly rising followed by 
relatively flat RN real wages.  We estimate AIDS wage differentials for three different categories 
of health care workers – RNs, licensed practical nurses (LPNs) and nursing aides, and remaining 
workers in the health care industry – focusing on the differential wage impact of AIDS for 
workers employed within and outside of the health care sector and allowing health care wages to 
                                                 
2 Ideally we would use prevalence rates for HIV rather than AIDS.  However, HIV prevalence data are not available 
for most of the period, and in any case are likely to be incomplete since many HIV-infected people do not realize 
they have HIV until AIDS develops. 
  3vary by MSA.   
Our results show a large AIDS-related wage differential for RNs.  Specifically, we find 
that a 10 percent increase in the local MSA AIDS rate raises the wage for RNs, relative to that 
for comparable non-health care workers, by nearly one percent.  The analogous effect is only 
slightly smaller for non-nursing health care practitioners but is much smaller and insignificant 
for remaining health care workers, consistent with the relative exposure each group likely has to 
HIV/AIDS. 
To further investigate whether RNs receive an AIDS wage premium, we examine data 
from the quadrennial 1988–2000 National Sample Survey of Registered Nurses (SRN).  By 
definition there are no non-RN control groups in the SRN, and the 1993 AIDS definition change 
dictates that we divide the data into pre- and post-1993 samples each containing only two years 
of data.  In order to both compare the RN wage premium to that potentially received by similar 
workers from outside of health care and account for potential MSA-specific effects, therefore, 
our specification includes the average CPS wage for college educated non-health care workers in 
the MSA of residence and survey year as an additional explanatory variable.  Results are quite 
similar to those for RNs from the CPS.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we lay out our methodology for 
estimating the compensating wage differential associated with AIDS risks.  We then describe the 
CPS and AIDS data in Section III, present our main results in Section IV, discuss the SRN data 




In order to estimate the impact of AIDS risks on the earnings differential between 
  4workers within and outside the health care sector, the effect of AIDS needs to be isolated from 
effects of other factors that are correlated with AIDS rates and also influence earnings.  Our 
basic regression specification thus allows both the wage effects of AIDS and wage trends to vary 
across sectors.  For instance, when the health care group of interest is RNs, we construct a 
sample that includes not only RNs but also workers employed in sectors other than health care 
who are comparable to RNs (in terms of educational attainment), and estimate the equation 
(1)  i i t t i i m m i i RN YEAR YEAR RN RN AIDS AIDS X W ε γ δ β β β α + × + + + × + + = ) ( ) ( ln 3 2 1 . 
 In  equation  1,   is the log of the hourly wage for worker i, X i W ln i is a vector of human 
capital and other individual characteristics that affect earnings,   represents the AIDS rate 
in MSA m,   is an indicator that worker i is an RN,   is a vector of year indicators, “
m AIDS
i RN t YEAR ×” 
represents an interaction between two variables,  i ε  is an error term that is uncorrelated with the 
vector of explanatory variables, and vectors α, δ, and γ along with scalars β1, β2, and β3 are 
parameters to be estimated.  The coefficient of interest is β2, which indicates the effect of AIDS 
on wages of RNs net of AIDS wage effects that are not sector specific.  These latter effects, 
captured by β1, include factors correlated with AIDS rates that are also correlated with wages, 
perhaps such as the crime rate, city size, or demand for AIDS-related services.  Alternatively, 
there could be an overall compensating differential to everyone in communities that have higher 
AIDS rates.  Other fixed wage differences between RNs and non-health care workers are 
captured by 3 β , and sector differences over time in wage movements are captured byδ  and γ. 
  A weakness of equation 1 is that wage variations across MSAs that result from 
differences in other factors not controlled for in the equation but are correlated with cross-MSA 
differences in AIDS rates are incorrectly attributed to AIDS rate variations.  A more complete 
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workers to vary by MSA: 
(2)  
i i m m
i t t i i m m i
RN MSA MSA
RN YEAR YEAR RN RN AIDS AIDS X W
ε λ φ
γ δ β β β α
+ × + +
× + + + × + + =
) (
) ( ) ( ln 3 2 1 . 
In equation 2, β2 is again the coefficient of interest, but MSA indicators explicitly capture MSA-
specific wage effects that do not vary across time, while interactions between the MSA and RN 
indicators control for time-invariant MSA-specific differentials between the wages of RNs and 
non-health care workers.   
We estimate equations 1 and 2 separately for three groups of health care workers: RNs, a 
combined group of LPNs and nursing aides, and health care workers not included in the first two 
groups.  All regressions are estimated by OLS, with standard errors adjusted for both clustering 
by MSA and heteroskedasticity of unknown form. 
 
III.  CDC & CPS Data 
 
Our AIDS rate information comes from the CDC, which publishes annual data on AIDS 
cases reported to them for all MSAs with populations of 500,000 or more.  For consolidated 
MSAs that consist of several primary MSAs (e.g. New York, Los Angeles, Chicago), rates are 
reported for all primary MSAs within the consolidated MSA that meet the population criterion.  
Rates are available for 107 MSAs during the sample period, which is restricted to 1987–2001 by 
two facets of the AIDS data: the CDC changed its definition of what constituted an AIDS case in 
1987, making previous reported rates non-comparable, and MSA-level data were available only 
through 2001 when we conducted the analysis. 
A third aspect of the AIDS data forces us to split the samples into two between 1992 & 
1993: in 1993 the CDC again changed its definition of AIDS.  Before 1993, the definition 
  6included only AIDS opportunistic illnesses.  However, because most HIV-infected people 
become severely immunosuppressed (low CD4+ count) before the onset of such illnesses, in 
1993 the definition was expanded to include a laboratory measure of immunosuppression along 
with three additional clinical conditions (pulmonary tuberculosis, recurrent pneumonia, and 
invasive cervical cancer) (CDC 1995).  Consequently, the number of AIDS cases reported in the 
U.S. jumped from 47,293 in 1992 (after increases of less than five percent the previous two 
years) to 104,759 in 1993.  Besides rendering pre- and post-1993 data non-comparable, a 
potentially important effect of this change is that it makes the AIDS rate a better proxy for the 
probability of HIV infection.  This suggests that the compensating wage differentials observed in 
the post-1993 period will be larger, and more reflective of the actual compensation that health 
care workers receive for AIDS risk, than those observed in the pre-1993 samples. 
Table 1 lists summary statistics for the AIDS data by year at the MSA level (using CPS 
sample weights).  The 1993 definition expansion is evident from the more than twofold increase 
in cases between 1992 and 1993.  After almost doubling from 1987–1992, the mean rate fell 
threefold during 1993–2001, with most of the decline occurring by 1998.  The sizable standard 
deviations indicate that rates vary widely across MSAs. 
AIDS rates are matched by MSA to individual responses from the 1987–2001 monthly 
Outgoing Rotation Group files of the CPS, which provides large samples of workers both within 
and outside of the health care industry.  The CPS identifies location of residence for 202 MSAs 
with populations of at least 100,000.  In each year, our samples include respondents living in 
MSAs for which the CPS contains at least seven workers of each type and the CDC reports 
AIDS data.
3  Health care workers are classified into three categories:  RNs, LPNs and nursing 
                                                 
3 Our results are similar when we require the CPS to contain at least 20 workers of each type in the MSA that year in 
order to include the MSA/year in the sample.   
  7aides, and other health care workers.  Our control group typically consists of workers who are 
not employed in the health care sector and have educational attainment similar to that of the 
comparison group, which we define as at least 16 years of school for RNs and 12–15 years for 
the other two health care groups.  Physicians are omitted because the CPS top-codes income, 
meaning that actual wages are likely to exceed observed wages for most physicians.  
Hourly earnings are defined as usual weekly earnings divided by usual hours worked per 
week and converted to 2001 dollars using the CPI for all urban consumers.  For the small 
percentage of workers in the sample who are above the earnings top code ($999 in 1987–88, 
$1,923 in 1989–97 and $2,885 in 1998–2001), we assign the mean above the cap, which is 
calculated using the assumption that the upper tail of the earnings distribution follows a Pareto 
distribution.
4  A small number of workers with implicit hourly wages of less than $3 and greater 
than $150 are omitted.  Individual characteristics included as explanatory variables are: years of 
schooling and years of experience, both in quadratic form; indicators for health care group, 
gender, race/ethnicity (African American, Hispanic, and white), marital status (currently and 
previously married), part-time status, union status, public employment and year; and interactions 
between health care group and year and between both years of experience terms and gender. 
Table 2 displays descriptive characteristics by group over the period and is useful for 
understanding our group selections.  Hourly wages are substantially higher for RNs and lower 
for LPNs/aides than for the other two groups.  The same holds for schooling.  RNs are also more 
likely to be female, in a union, employed part time or in a hospital, and married.  Sample sizes 
are smaller for RNs and LPNs/aides (the main reason for combining LPNs and aides into a single 
group) than for other health care workers.   
                                                 
4 Hirsch and Macpherson (2002, p. 6) provide estimates of gender-specific means above the cap for 1973–2001.  For 
observations with non-positive usual hours worked per week or “variable hours” (after 1994), we use hours worked 
the previous week.  Absent information on hours worked, observations are dropped. 
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period, we construct an adjusted wage index for each group.  A separate log wage equation, with 
the same set of explanatory variables as listed earlier, is estimated for each group.  Indexes are 
calculated from the year indicator coefficients, with the value set to 100 in 1987 (the omitted first 
year of the series).  Figure 1 displays these indexes.  The 1987–1993 period was one of rapidly 
rising RN wages: an RN earned almost 15 percent more in 1993 than did an RN with identical 
observed characteristics in 1987.  Wage growth for the other groups during this period was 
slower, and wages actually declined for non-health workers.  During 1993-2001, wages of health 
care workers first fell and then rose.  Since 1993, RN wage growth has been similar to that of 
wages for college educated females working outside of nursing.  
 
IV. CPS  Results 
a. 1993–2001 
Table 3 displays estimation results for the 1993–2001 CPS samples.  The columns 
without primes (’) show estimates of equation 1, which omits MSA indicators and interactions 
between MSA and health care group indicators, while those with primes show estimates of 
equation 2, which contains MSA indicators and interactions.  The first line shows the coefficient 
on the logged AIDS rate, which is the estimated average impact of AIDS on wages of control 
group workers.  The second line shows the coefficient on the interaction between the logged 
AIDS rate and the health care group indicator, which is the estimated average additional impact 
of AIDS on health care workers beyond any impact on control group workers, i.e. the 
compensating wage differential for health care workers because of AIDS risks, and is therefore 
the line upon which we focus.   
  9Specifications 1 and 2 estimate AIDS wage effects for RNs.  Columns 1 and 1’ compare 
RNs with non-health care workers who have completed at least 16 years of schooling, i.e. are 
college graduates.
5  The estimated AIDS wage differential in column 1’ is 70 percent larger than 
that in column 1 and is statistically significant, implying that a 10 percent AIDS rate increase 
raises RN wages by 0.8 percent relative to wages of comparable workers outside the health care 
sector.  Columns 2 and 2’ compare RNs with health care workers who are not RNs, LPNs or 
nursing aides.  The estimated AIDS wage differential is again positive and significant and, 
regardless of whether MSA indicators and interactions are included, is about two-thirds the size 
of the column 1’ differential.  These results suggest that RNs earn a wage premium because they 
risk infection with HIV/AIDS as part of their jobs, and that this premium is relative not only to 
wages of workers outside of health care but also, albeit with slightly smaller magnitude, to wages 
of other health care workers who likely have less exposure to HIV/AIDS than do RNs.  
Specification 3 compares the LPN/nursing aide group to workers outside the health care 
sector who have 12–15 years of schooling, a restriction imposed here and in remaining 
specifications in order to make more comparable the average educational attainment between the 
health care and control groups.  The AIDS wage differential is paradoxically negative and 
significant when MSA indicators and interactions are omitted, but adding these indicators and 
interactions renders the differential insignificant.  The absence of an AIDS-related wage 
premium for LPNs and nursing aides is not surprising, to the extent that these types of nurses 
have substantially less exposure to blood and other potentially HIV-infected bodily fluids than 
do RNs because of restrictions on the types of procedures that LPNs and aides are allowed to 
perform (e.g. in some states LPNs cannot draw blood). 
The remaining three specifications compare other health care workers to the group of 
                                                 
5 Further restricting this group to females yields similar results. 
  10workers from outside health care.  Columns 4 and 4’ include all health care workers who are not 
RNs, LPNs, and nursing aides.  The estimated AIDS wage differential for this group is only 
slightly more than one-quarter the size of that for RNs in specification 1, and becomes only 
marginally significant when MSA indicators and interactions are added.  We further divide the 
other health care group, based on occupation, into practitioners and non-practitioners in order to 
isolate workers who are likely to have direct contact with patients and examine whether AIDS 
wage premiums are larger for this group, as our compensating wage differential explanation for 
these premiums would suggest.  Indeed, the estimated differential for practitioners in column 5’ 
is significant and twice as large as that for non-practitioners in column 6’, though it is only about 
one-half the magnitude of that for RNs.  
In Table 3 we thus observe AIDS wage differentials that are large for RNs, smaller for 
non-nursing health care practitioners, and insignificantly different from zero for other nurses and 
non-nursing non-practitioners.  It appears, then, that the size of the AIDS wage differential 
diminishes along with on-the-job exposure to HIV/AIDS infection risks, taking into account the 
extent to which each group has patient contact and is allowed or required to engage in procedures 
that involve exposure to potentially HIV-infected bodily fluid as part of their work duties.  This 
pattern suggests that the AIDS wage differential is in fact compensation for infection risk.   
A large proportion of interaction between health care workers and AIDS patients occurs 
in hospitals.  Since RNs are more likely to work in hospitals than are other health care workers, 
while LPNs and nursing aides are less likely to do so (Table 2), a potential alternative 
explanation for the estimated AIDS wage differentials is that they simply reflect the extent to 
which each group works in hospitals.  In results not shown, we split the samples into those 
employed in hospitals and elsewhere.  For RNs, the AIDS wage differential is quite similar to 
  11that shown in column 1’ of Table 3 in both the hospital and non-hospital samples.  Likewise, the 
differential for other healthcare workers is largely unchanged, whereas the differential for the 
LPN/aides group is virtually zero both in and out of hospitals.  Although the lack of importance 
of working in a hospital may seem surprising at first, many RNs who work outside of hospitals 
are employed in places such as surgery centers where they have comparable exposure to 
potential HIV/AIDS infection. 
This suggests that the significant AIDS wage differential for RNs relative to LPNs and 
aides is a consequence not of differences in employment setting, but rather of differences in job 
attributes, particularly in the amount contact with needles, blood and other potentially infected 
bodily fluid.  Additionally, RNs generally have more education and skills than LPNs and aides, 
and therefore might possess greater job mobility.  With a wider employment opportunity set, 
RNs would require compensation to work in environments with greater risk of HIV/AIDS 
infection to a greater extent than would LPNs and aides. 
To check the robustness of the estimated AIDS wage differential for RNs to possible 
alternative explanations, we ran two modified versions of the column 1’ specification.  To 
address the possibility that the differential is being driven by a strong positive correlation 
between AIDS rates and nursing wages in a few large metropolitan areas with particularly high 
AIDS rates and wages, we added the triple interaction term between the AIDS rate, the RN 
indicator and an indicator that the AIDS rate in the MSA is in the top 10 percentile of rates for 
that year.  However, the estimated AIDS wage differential is unchanged and the additional 
interaction term is insignificant.  Another data artifact that could drive the results is the inflation 
of AIDS cases in 1993, and possibly subsequent years to a lesser degree, when the newly 
expanded case definition added to AIDS counts not only people truly making the transition to 
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been by the new definition if that definition had been used earlier.  Splitting the 1993–2001 
sample into early and later periods, though, yields results that are quite similar to those shown, 
suggesting that the wage effect is relatively constant over this period despite any impact of the 
1993 case definition change.   
The addition of MSA indicators has a large effect on the estimated AIDS wage 
differential, particularly for RNs and other health care practitioners.  One possible explanation is 
the relationship between market size and earnings.  Hirsch and Schumacher (1995) find an 
inverse relationship between relative nursing wages and market size (contrary to the monopsony 
hypothesis), potentially attributable to a correlation between market size and unmeasured worker 
and job quality attributes.  Because AIDS rates increase with market size, if unmeasured quality 
rises more slowly with respect to market size for RNs and other health care practitioners than for 
others, when MSA indicators are not included the coefficient on the interaction between the 
AIDS rate and RN/practitioner group indicators will include a negative component along with 
any actual AIDS wage differential.  Since this is a geographic phenomenon that does not vary 
across time, MSA indicators absorb these unmeasured differences so that the interaction between 
the AIDS rate and RN/practitioner indicators reflects the actual AIDS wage differential.   
In each specification, the estimated overall AIDS effect is positive, large and significant 
without MSA indicators and interactions, but becomes small and insignificant when these 
indicators and interactions are added.  A likely reason is that larger cities have both higher costs 
of living and higher AIDS rates, creating a spurious positive correlation between AIDS rates and 
wages in the absence of MSA indicators.  Since this correlation persists over time, i.e. is again a 
phenomenon created purely by geographic variation, it is absorbed by the MSA indicators when 
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b. 1987–1992 
Table 4 shows estimated AIDS wage differentials for the same specifications as in Table 
3, but using 1987–1992 data in which AIDS counts are determined by the 1987 CDC definition 
that encompasses substantially fewer cases than does the 1993 definition.  The RN differential in 
column 1’ is only half the size of the analogous differential in Table 3 and is no longer 
significant.  Similarly, the differentials for RNs in column 2’ and other health practitioners in 5’ 
are much smaller than in Table 3 and have also become insignificant.  For no group does there 
appear to be a significant AIDS wage differential during 1987–1992.   
A possible explanation is that wages took awhile to adjust to HIV/AIDS risks and did not 
fully do so until the later period.  However, such slow wage adjustment seems unlikely given that 
the earlier period involved much more uncertainty regarding the ways in which HIV could be 
contracted.  In particular, many thought HIV could be transmitted much more easily than is 
actually the case, so that if anything a larger differential might be expected in the earlier period. 
The likely reason the differential is instead smaller, and for most specifications non-
existent, is the AIDS definition itself.  Based on the time trend in cases in CPS MSAs (as shown 
in Table 2) and in the U.S. as a whole (as described earlier), roughly twice as many cases were 
reported using the new definition in 1993 as would have been reported if the 1987 definition had 
still been used.  Perhaps as important is that these newly counted cases were primarily less 
severe than those previously counted in that they represented severely immunosuppression that 
occurred before the onset of AIDS opportunistic illnesses.  Thus it seems that differences in 
measured AIDS rates across locations and time did not reflect true differences in HIV/AIDS 
risks before 1993 because the 1987 AIDS definition failed to capture many types of AIDS cases 
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truly matter, and the 1987 definition excluded many pre-symptomatic cases from the AIDS count 
that involved HIV risks for workers who cared for patients with HIV. 
 
V.  SRN – Data and Results 
Although the pattern of results observed in the CPS data seems plausible, replication of 
this pattern in different data would provide some assurance that our hypothesized explanations 
are accurate.  In an attempt to do so, we turn to the National Sample Survey of Registered Nurses 
(SRN), a voluntary survey of roughly 30,000 licensed RNs conducted every four years by the 
Bureau of Health Professions.   To match the time periods analyzed in the CPS, we form a pre-
1993 sample by pooling the 1988 and 1992 SRN and a post-1993 sample by pooling the 1996 
and 2000 SRN.    
Because the SRN samples only RNs, we can neither analyze other nursing or health care 
workers nor include a control group in the sample.  As an alternative method of estimating the 
AIDS wage differential, therefore, we include as an explanatory variable the average log wage 
for the CPS non-health care college educated group (the same control group as used in columns 1 
and 1’ of Tables 3 and 4), specific to MSA and year.  We thus estimate the wage equation   
(3)     i i t m i i W NH YEAR AIDS X W ε γ δ β α + + + + = ) ln ( ln 1 , 
where  ) ln ( i W NH  is the average log wage of the non-health care control group in the RN’s MSA for the 
year of observation.  Since the estimated β1 indicates the effect of AIDS on RN wages while holding 
wages of comparable workers from outside health care constant, it effectively serves as an estimate of the 
AIDS wage differential.  Inclusion of the non-health average wage also controls for city-specific 
differences in cost of living and other determinants of overall wage levels, though in an alternative 
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include indicators for nine age categories (eight five-year groups between 25 and 64 along with age 65+, 
with under 25 years old as the omitted group: more specific age information is unavailable), being 
currently and previously married, having children younger than six and any children but none younger 
than six in the house, eight Census divisions and one of the two years. 
Table 5 displays the SRN results.  For the 1988–1992 sample, the positive AIDS effect 
estimated in column 1 diminishes in magnitude by 60 percent once the control wage variable is 
added in column 2, and becomes insignificant once MSA indicators are added in column 3.  In 
contrast, the estimated AIDS effect for the 1996–2000 sample is twice as large in column 4 as for 
the earlier sample in column 1, and declines in magnitude only slightly when the control wage 
variable is added in column 5.  The effect size falls by more than half when MSA indicators are 
added in column 6, but remains positive and nearly significant.   
The SRN results thus are broadly consistent with those for RNs in the CPS: an AIDS 
wage differential exists but it is much smaller using the 1987 AIDS definition in pre-1993 data 
than using the 1993 definition in post-1993 data.  In particular, the estimates from the models 
that include the control wage but not MSA indicators, i.e. those in columns 2 and 5 of Table 5, 
are quite similar to those in columns 1’ of Tables 4 and 3, respectively.  The estimates in both 
Tables 3 and 5 indicate an AIDS wage differential of 0.8 percent for a 10 percent increase in the 
AIDS rate.  Analogously, both the Table 4 and 5 estimates reveal a substantially smaller effect in 
the earlier period: the CPS estimate is larger but only the SRN estimate is significant.  Even the 
column 3 and 6 estimates in Table 5 parallel the CPS results, though with only two years of data, 
separated by four years, in each SRN sample, and the control wage variable already accounting 
for cross-MSA wage differences, including MSA indicators might be asking too much of the 
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periods in two independent data sets provides strong support for our hypotheses of a 
compensating wage differential for AIDS risks that is more difficult to observe with the 1987 
AIDS definition than with the more expansive 1993 definition. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Our study tests the hypothesis that health labor markets compensate workers who face 
risks of infection with HIV/AIDS as part of their jobs by examining the differential effect of 
local AIDS prevalence on the earnings of workers within and outside the health care sector.  We 
find strong evidence that this type of compensating wage differential exists when AIDS is 
defined to include cases of severe immunosupression that occur before the onset of AIDS 
opportunistic illnesses.  Specifically, our estimates indicate that in data using the 1993 definition 
of AIDS, a 10 percent increase in the AIDS rate in the metropolitan area of residence leads to an 
increase in RN wages of slightly less than one percent relative to wages of college educated non-
health care workers.  This effect is substantially larger than that found for other health care 
workers in the same period, with the exception of non-nursing health care practitioners, and for 
RNs and other health care practitioners during the pre-1993 period.  The relative on-the-job 
exposure that each health care group has to potential HIV infection suggests that these AIDS 
wage effects represent compensating differentials paid to RNs and other health care practitioners 
because they care for HIV/AIDS patients as part of their jobs.  Presumably this additional 
compensation is primarily to offset the risk of HIV/AIDS infection, but could also be necessary, 
for example, because of the psychologically difficulty of working with patients such as those 
with late-stage AIDS who are likely to die while under the care of the worker.   
  17AIDS rates fell steadily after 1993.  Based on our results, this decline implies a 
diminishing compensating AIDS wage differential over the period that partially explains the 
convergence between wages for RNs and college educated non-health female workers, and 
between other health and non-health workers, that is observed in Figure 1.  
These results are interesting for at least two reasons.  One is that they represent a tangible 
example of a compensating wage differential that had not previously been considered by 
economists.  The other is that they represent additional evidence of behavioral responses to 
AIDS risks, in that these compensating differentials would not exist if they were not necessary to 
induce RNs into local markets.  Policies that lower the prevalence of HIV and AIDS, therefore, 
carry the additional benefit of reducing the wage necessary to attract individuals into RN and 
other health practitioner jobs. The findings here suggest that AIDS rate reductions would provide 
substantial savings to society in the form of reduced RN compensation.  For example, a 10 
percent AIDS rate decline would induce a 0.8 percent decline in wages, or about $0.20 per hour 
at the average 2002 wage.   With over two million RNs employed in the U.S., this comes to a 
savings of $400,000 per hour, which translates to $800 million per year for full time work.
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Data are from the 1987–2001 Current Population Survey monthly Outgoing Rotation Group files.  Each index is 
constructed from a separate regression that controls for years of schooling, years of experience in quadratic form, 
and indicators for gender, race/ethnicity (African American, Hispanic, and white), marital status (currently and 
previously married), part-time status, union status, public employment, year, and interactions between the two 
experience terms and gender.  Indexes are created by converting the year dummy coefficients (which are in log wage 
terms) to percentages and multiplying by 100. 
  20Table 1 
Mean Annual MSA AIDS Cases and Rates 
 










































































































Data are from annual CDC HIV/AIDS Surveillance Reports.  The AIDS rate represents reported AIDS cases per 
100,000 MSA residents.  Means are weighted by the CPS data used in the subsequent analysis.  Standard deviations 
are in parentheses. 
 
  21Table 2 
CPS Descriptive Characteristics by Group and Period 
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Data are from the 1987–2001 Current Population Survey monthly Outgoing Rotation Group files.  LPNs are 
licensed practical nurses, other health care workers are workers in the health care sector who are not RNs, LPNs or 
nursing aides, and non-health care workers are workers not employed in the health care sector. 
 
  22Table 3 
The Effect of AIDS on the Wage Differential between Health Care  
and Non-Health Care Workers: 1993–2001 CPS Data 
 
  RN v. Non-health care 
(schooling ≥ 16 years) 
RN v. Other health care  LPN v. Non-health care 
(12–15 years schooling) 
  1 1’ 2 2’ 3 3’ 
Log (AIDS rate) 
 












        














        


















 Other  health  care 
v. Non-health care 
 (12–15 years schooling) 
OHC practitioners  
v. Non-health care 
(12–15 years schooling) 
OHC non-practitioners 
vs. Non-health care  
(12–15 years schooling) 
  4 4’ 5 5’ 6 6’ 














        














        

















Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity of unknown form and clustering by MSA are in parentheses.  MSA 
indicators and interactions between MSA and health care group indicators are omitted from regressions 1–6 but 
included in regressions 1’–6’.  Regressions 1 and 1’ restrict the non-health care comparison group to those with at 
least 16 years of schooling.  Regressions 5 and 5’ (6 and 6’) include only those other health care workers who are 
(not) in practitioner occupations.  Other explanatory variables in these regressions include years of schooling, years 
of experience in quadratic form, and indicators for health care group, gender, race/ethnicity (African American, 
Hispanic, and white), marital status (currently and previously married), part-time status, union status, public 
employment, year, and interactions between health care group and year and both experience terms and gender. 
  23Table 4 
The Effect of AIDS on the Wage Differential between Health Care  
and Non-Health Care Workers: 1987–1992 CPS Data 
 
  RN v. Non-health care 
(schooling ≥ 16 years) 
RN v. Other health care  LPN v. Non-health care 
(12–15 years schooling) 
  1 1’ 2 2’ 3 3’ 
Log (AIDS rate) 
 












        














        


















 Other  health  care 
v. Non-health care 
 (12–15 years schooling) 
OHC practitioners  
v. Non-health care 
(12–15 years schooling) 
OHC non-practitioners 
vs. Non-health care  
(12–15 years schooling) 
  4 4’ 5 5’ 6 6’ 














        














        

















Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity of unknown form and clustering by MSA are in parentheses.  MSA 
indicators and interactions between MSA and health care group indicators are omitted from regressions 1–6 but 
included in regressions 1’–6’.  Regressions 1 and 1’ restrict the non-health care comparison group to those with at 
least 16 years of schooling.  Regressions 5 and 5’ (6 and 6’) include only those other health care workers who are 
(not) in practitioner occupations.  Other explanatory variables in these regressions include years of schooling, years 
of experience in quadratic form, and indicators for health care group, gender, race/ethnicity (African American, 
Hispanic, and white), marital status (currently and previously married), part-time status, union status, public 
employment, year, and interactions between health care group and year and both experience terms and gender. 
  24Table 5 
The Effect of AIDS on the Wages of Registered Nurses: SRN Data 
 
  1988 and 1992 surveys  1996 and 2000 surveys 
 1  2  3  4  5  6 















































































































































MSA indicators  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
 
Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity of unknown form and clustering by MSA are in parentheses.  The 
control wage is the average wage of college-educated workers in the MSA and year, imputed from the CPS using 
the column 1’ specification of Tables 3 and 4.  Columns 1 and 4 include neither the control wage nor MSA 
indicators, columns 2 and 5 include the control wage but not MSA indicators, and columns 3 and 6 include both the 
control wage and MSA indicators.  Other explanatory variables in these regressions include indicators for nine age 
categories (eight five-year groups between 25 and 64 along with age 65+, with less than 25 as the omitted group), 
being currently and previously married, having children younger than six and any children but none younger than 
six in the house, eight Census divisions and one of the two years. 
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